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Abstract
In this thesis, we propose an adaptive mechanism for the delivery of safety mes-
sages in vehicular networks in an authenticated and privacy-preserving manner. The 
traditional approach to message delivery for driving safety applications running on ve-
hicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has been to increase redundancy, often at the sake of 
other applications running on the network. We argue that this approach does not ac-
commodate the traffic conditions of crowded cities like İstanbul, and present a probabil-
istic method for the dissemination of area-persistent safety messages in infrastructure-
less vehicular networks that dynamically adapts itself to changing road conditions. Our 
proposed protocol utilizes short  group  signatures for privacy-preserving authentication, 
and keyed-Hash Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) with one-way  hash chains to 
decrease computational load on Onboard Units (OBUs).
We also introduce a vehicular mobility  model that creates scenarios of high-speed 
traffic on crowded highways based on realistic assumptions, and measure the perform-
ance of the proposed protocol using scenarios generated by this model. Our simulations 
show that the proposed method decreases network traffic by up to 82% and shortens 
delivery delays by up to 13% when compared to non-probabilistic methods in highway 
scenarios with medium to high vehicle density.
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TASARSIZ ARAÇSAL AĞLARDA BÖLGEDE KALICI EMNİYET MESAJLARININ 
VERİMLİ VE GÜVENLİ DAĞITIMI
Can Berk Güder
CS, Master Tezi, 2009
Tez Danışmanları: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi, Doç. Dr. Özgür Erçetin
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tasarsız araçsal ağlar, sürüş emniyeti, bölgede kalıcı mesajlar, 
olasılıklı algoritmalar, bölgesel yönlendirme
Özet
Bu tezde, araçsal ağlarda emniyet mesajlarının dağıtımı için değişen koşullara 
uyum sağlayan bir mekanizma öneriyoruz. Tasarsız araçsal ağlar üzerinde çalışan sürüş 
emniyeti uygulamaları için mesaj dağıtımına geleneksel yaklaşım, ağ üzerinde çalışan 
diğer uygulamaların pahasına da olsa, artıklığı arttırmak şeklinde olmuştur. Bu yak-
laşımın, İstanbul gibi kalabalık şehirlerin trafik koşullarına uyum sağlamadığını sa-
vunuyor, ve altyapısız araçsal ağlarda bölgede kalıcı emniyet  mesajlarının yayılımı için 
değişen yol koşullarına uyum sağlayan, olasılıklı bir yöntem sunuyoruz. Önerdiğimiz bu 
protokol, mahremiyeti koruyan kimlik denetimi için kısa grup imzalarından, ve araç 
üstü birimlerdeki işlem yükünü azaltmak için anahtarlı-Özet Mesaj Doğrulama Kodları 
ve tek yönlü özet zincirlerinden faydalanmaktadır.
Kalabalık otoyollardaki hızlı trafik senaryolarını, gerçekçi varsayımlara dayanarak 
yaratabilen bir taşıt  hareket modeli tanıtıyor, ve önerdiğimiz protokolün performansını 
bu model tarafından yaratılan senaryoları kullanarak ölçüyoruz. Simülasyonlarımız, ön-
erilen yöntemin orta ve yüksek araç yoğunluğuna sahip otoyol senaryolarında, olasılıklı 
olmayan yöntemlerle karşılaştırıldığında ağ trafiğini %82’ye kadar azalttığını ve 
dağıtım sürelerini %13’e kadar kısalttığını gösteriyor.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are a form of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANETs) where the nodes in the network are the vehicles on the road. VANETs pro-
vide communication among vehicles on the road, or between vehicles and a roadside 
infrastructure, with the purpose of increasing the safety and comfort of drivers and pas-
sengers alike. The applications running on VANETs are therefore commonly  classified 
as (driving) safety applications and comfort  applications. The first  category  might in-
clude applications like Electronic Brake Lights (EBL) or radar-like applications, while 
the second category includes Internet access, online gaming, etc.
Driving safety applications are arguably the most important applications running 
on a vehicular network. One such application could be a “Virtual Traffic Sign” applica-
tion that provides the same function as physical traffic signs: providing drivers with in-
formation regarding road conditions and emergency situations. Virtual traffic signs, un-
like physical traffic signs, can be generated dynamically by  the vehicles using the road, 
thereby providing users with unsurpassed flexibility.
The main challenge with virtual traffic sign applications on vehicular networks 
without a reliable infrastructure (or none at all) is keeping the virtual traffic sign alive 
for as long as the information conveyed is current and relevant. The traditional approach 
to this challenge has been to increase redundancy, even at the sake of other applications 
running on the network.
In this thesis, we show that this approach does not accommodate the extreme traf-
fic conditions of crowded cities like İstanbul, resulting in higher delays and lower deliv-
ery rates. We present a probabilistic method of disseminating virtual traffic sign mes-
sages that decreases network traffic by up  to 82% and shortens delivery delays by up to 
1
13% when compared to non-probabilistic approaches in highway  scenarios with low or 
medium vehicle density.
To be able to clearly  demonstrate our contribution, we also introduce a new mo-
bility generator called mugen that creates mobility scenarios based on realistic assump-
tions.
Finally, we propose the use of keyed-Hash Message Authentication Codes 
(HMACs), one-way  hash chains and group signatures for an efficient security frame-
work that provides message authentication and conditional privacy.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We present an overview of previous 
research in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we describe our system model. In Chapter 4, we 
explain our mobility  model, and introduce our mobility generator, mugen. In Chapter 5, 
we describe our security and privacy framework. In Chapter 6, we introduce our main 
contribution, the Adaptive-p algorithm. In Chapter 7, we evaluate the performance of 
the proposed algorithm. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 8.
2
Chapter 2
LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Literature on Mobility
Node movement is one of the most important differences between vehicular net-
works and other wireless ad-hoc networks. In wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for ex-
ample, nodes are typically considered stationary1. In wireless mesh networks, node 
movement is little (if any) and slow.
In VANETs, node movement is continuous and usually very fast, as compared to 
other forms of MANETs. Due to the unique nature of node movement, different mobil-
ity  models tend to give remarkably different results in VANET simulations, making the 
use of a realistic mobility model vital to any study of these networks.
The most basic approach to node mobility is the Random Waypoint (RWP) model 
[1], where nodes move between randomly  selected points in space at a uniform speed. 
In [2], Choffnes and Bustamante demonstrate that this model fails to produce realistic 
results.
In [3], Saha and Johnson present a more realistic model based on the RWP model. 
They  use real road maps from the U.S. Census Bureau’s TIGER (Topologically  Inte-
grated Geographic Encoding and Referencing) system, and develop  a mobility  generator 
that has vehicles moving on the shortest path between two random points on the road 
network at a uniform speed. In [2], Choffnes and Bustamante present an even more real-
istic model that considers the number of lanes on each road, inter-vehicular distance and 
traffic congestion. We classify these two mobility models as enhanced RWP models.
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1 Possibly except for a few mobile nodes or coincidental movement caused by environ-
mental factors.
With the recent increase in GPS (Global Positioning System) usage in cars, real 
trace data became a viable alternative to synthesized vehicle movement. In [4], Li et al. 
use real GPS trace data gathered from the taxis of Shanghai, China. In [5], Füßler et al. 
use reality-audited movement data from German autobahns. In [6], Jetcheva et al. use 
GPS trace data of the fleet of city buses in Seattle, WA.
Note that in [4] and [6], only a subset of the vehicles occupying the road network 
is traced, and that in [5] a synthesized model is based on GPS trace data. Tracing all ve-
hicles is impractical, if not impossible.
As an alternative to GPS tracing, Raney  et al. [7] introduce a Multi-agent Micro-
scopic Traffic Simulator (MMTS) that  runs on a Beowulf cluster and simulates the vehi-
cle traffic on all of Switzerland’s roads. To the best of our knowledge, the MMTS is the 
most realistic synthesized vehicular mobility model proposed so far. However, we only 
consider short  simulations of highway segments, while the MMTS creates real-time 
simulations of whole cities or countries, requiring immense computing power. This 
makes the use of such a simulator superfluous for the purposes of this thesis.
In Chapter 4, we present our own enhanced RWP model based on the work by 
Saha and Johnson in [3].
2.2 Literature on Routing
For the purposes of our thesis, we concentrate solely on broadcast and geocast 
routing protocols.
2.2.1 Broadcast Routing
Broadcasting is a popular routing method in VANETs, and the simplest broadcast-
ing protocol is flooding, where each vehicle re-broadcasts each message it receives. 
While flooding works well for small networks, network traffic increases exponentially 
with the number of nodes, and performance degrades quickly.
A number of attempts have been made to develop a high-performance flooding-
like broadcast algorithm. In [8], Sun et al. propose the Vector-based Tracking Detection 
(V-TRADE) and History-enhanced V-TRADE (HV-TRADE) algorithms that take ad-
vantage of location information to divide neighbor nodes into forwarding groups. This 
way, the number of re-broadcasting nodes is limited, and bandwidth utilization is nota-
bly improved.
In the Urban Multi-Hop Broadcast (UMB) protocol [9], the originating node 
picks a single neighbor node (the farthest node) to re-broadcast the message. Compared 
with two topology-unaware flooding protocols (802.11-distance and 802.11-random), 
UMB shows significant improvements on success rate, load and dissemination speed.
Another approach to limiting the number of re-broadcasts is through the clustering 
of nodes. In [10], Durresi et al. propose ICE, which organizes vehicles into clusters 
(cells) according to their locations. The vehicle closest to the cluster center is self-
elected as the cell leader, and handles all inter-cluster communication. When compared 
with DOLPHIN [11], ICE shows significant improvements in delay and load.
2.2.2 Geocast Routing
Geocast routing [12] is, in essence, broadcast routing limited to a geographical 
region, usually  called the geocast region or the Zone of Relevance (ZoR) [13]. In this 
sense, broadcast routing can be seen as a special case of geocast routing where the geo-
cast region is the whole network.
Figure 2.1 shows the difference between unicast, broadcast and geocast  routing. In 
this figure, the black rectangles are the source vehicles, and the dark gray rectangles are 
the destination vehicles. The shaded area in the third subfigure is the geocast region.
In [14], Briesemeister et al. propose a basic geocast scheme where the node that is 
furthest from the source node rebroadcasts the message. The number of rebroadcasts is 
limited using a hop count. In this protocol, no distinct geocast region information is 
contained in the messages, but the location information of the message originator is, and 
the geocast region is assumed to be centered on this location.
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(a) Unicast routing
(b) Broadcast routing
(c) Geocast routing
Figure 2.1: Different routing protocols
Bachir and Benslimane [15] propose the Inter-Vehicle Geocast (IVG) protocol, the 
idea behind which is very  similar to that behind [14], but receiving vehicles drop certain 
messages if they  deem irrelevant to themselves, possibly further reducing the number of 
re-broadcasts.
Maihöfer and Eberhardt [16] propose a cached greedy geocast protocol. In their 
approach, greedy routing (where packets are always forwarded to the neighboring node 
that is closest to the packet’s final destination) is enhanced by adding a cache at the 
routing layer, which stores messages that cannot be forwarded due to local maxima. 
Simulation results show that the proposed caching mechanism increases delivery rates 
by up to 300 percent.
In [17], Maihöfer et al. propose three approaches for an abiding geocast protocol 
in which messages are delivered not only to the vehicles inside the geocast region at the 
time of delivery, but also to those vehicles that  have been or will be inside the geocast 
region for some time during a predefined message lifetime. The three proposed ap-
proaches are: (1) storing the messages on intfrastructure-provided servers, (2) storing 
the messages on elected nodes, and (3) storing the messages on all nodes.
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The routing requirements of our virtual traffic sign application are quite similar to 
the requirements in [17]. However, we assume an infrastructureless network, therefore 
the messages must be stored on the nodes. Instead of electing storage nodes or storing 
the messages on all nodes, we let the nodes decide which messages are relevant, and 
should be stored. This is similar to the approach in [15].
2.3 Literature on Privacy and Security
Symmetric cryptosystems, such as the AES [18], are the de-facto choice for 
resource-constrained systems with a limited number of nodes (such as WSNs) for their 
performance and ease of use. In these systems, a key  pre-distribution scheme [19] is 
usually  employed, where nodes are dealt random encryption keys before being de-
ployed. Each node must be given a certain number of keys (that increases with the 
number of nodes in the network) to guarantee connectivity, and some of these keys must 
be revoked if a node is compromised. The sheer number of nodes in VANETs makes it 
infeasible to use such a key  pre-distribution scheme. Also, since node movement is very 
fast in VANETs, connectivity  might only  be maintained for short periods of time in cer-
tain situations, and therefore the nodes might not have enough time to agree on a mutual 
encryption key. For these reasons, public-key cryptography is usually preferred to sym-
metric cryptography in VANETs2.
The concept of public-key cryptography, put forward by Diffie and Hellman in 
1976 [21], is considered to be the most important breakthrough in the history  of cryp-
tography  [22]. The development of public-key cryptography led to two important appli-
cations: asymmetric encryption and digital signatures. In our work, we focus on the lat-
ter.
After Diffie and Hellman's work, a number of public-key cryptosystems emerged. 
Among these cryptosystems, the RSA [23] and ElGamal [24] cryptosystems have be-
come the most popular and widely adopted [25]. The security  of most of these early 
public-key cryptosystems depend on the integer factorization problem (RSA) or the dis-
7
2 Some hybrid approaches, such as the Secure Anonymous Broadcasting (SAB) protocol 
[20], have also been proposed.
crete logarithm problem on finite cyclic groups (ElGamal, Diffie-Hellman key  ex-
change, DSA).
In the late 80s, Miller [26] and Koblitz [27] independently  suggested the use of 
elliptic curves in cryptography, which led to elliptic-curve public-key cryptosystems 
such as the Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Elliptic-curve crypto-
systems, requiring much less storage space than cryptosystems like RSA or DSA3, be-
came especially popular in resource-constrained systems, such as embedded systems or 
WSNs.
Strong digital signatures provide authentication, data integrity  and non-
repudiation, but they do not provide anonymity unless they’re used with anonymous 
key pairs. In [28], Raya and Hubaux proposed using a large number of anonymous key 
pairs at every node, but this approach shares the same practical problems with a sym-
metric key pre-distribution method [29]. In [29], Lu et al. propose Efficient Conditional 
Privacy Preservation (ECPP) protocol that relies on Roadside Units (RSUs) to provide 
short-time anonymous keys.
A number of group-based approaches were proposed to provide anonymity  in ve-
hicular networks. In [30], Wasef and Shen propose the Privacy Preserving Group Com-
munications Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (PPGCV), which is based on the 
GKMPAN protocol by Zhu et al. [31]. Both works are mainly concerned with group 
rekeying.
Introduced by Chaum and van Heyst in [32], group signatures allow members of a 
predefined group to digitally sign messages on behalf of the whole group, providing 
anonymity for the signer. In the case of a dispute, a previously selected group manager 
can reveal the identity of a signature’s originator.
To the best of our knowledge, the use of group signatures in a vehicular context 
was first proposed by Boneh et al. in [33]. However, their work concentrates on the de-
velopment of a group signature scheme that creates shorter signatures compared to pre-
8
3 ECDSA with a 160-bit key provides roughly the same security level as RSA or DSA 
with 1024-bit keys. [22] Signatures generated using DSA or ECDSA are also much 
shorter than signatures generated using RSA: about 320 bits for 160-bit ECDSA or 
1024-bit DSA, compared to at least 1024 bits for 1024-bit RSA.
vious approaches, rather than the application of group  signature schemes in vehicular 
contexts.
In [34], Lin et al. propose the Group Signature and Identity-based Signature 
(GSIS) scheme, where they employ the short group signature scheme proposed in [33] 
among vehicles, and identity-based signatures between vehicles and RSUs.
In [35], Lin et al. propose the TESLA based Secure Vehicular Communication 
(TSVC) scheme that employs the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol [36] with 
anonymous key pairs for the conventional digital signature scheme.
Our proposed security model, explained in Chapter 5, employs group  signatures 
and the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol, and is mainly based on the work by 
Lin et al. in [35].
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Chapter 3
SYSTEM MODEL
Our system model consists of four basic entity sets (events, regions, messages and 
vehicles) residing on a road network.
Vehicles are nodes traveling on the road network according to the mobility model. 
In compliance with the Dedicated Short-range Communications (DSRC) specifications 
[37], they periodically broadcast short messages called beacons.
Events are phenomena tied to certain parts of the road network called critical re-
gions. When a vehicle’s onboard sensors or driving safety mechanisms detect an event, 
the vehicle defines a zone of relevance for the detected event, and sends a Virtual Sign 
message to the vehicles inside this region. We call these regions message regions. Vehi-
cles receiving a Virtual Sign message try  to keep the contents of the message persistent 
in the message region defined by the originating vehicle.
Finally, we define an inspection region and limit some of our performance metrics 
to only the vehicles inside this region.
3.1 Road Network
Our road network is created to imitate a common highway segment with entrance 
and exit ramps on each side of the road.
Figure 3.1 shows the road network used in our simulations: a 3 kilometer-long 
highway with two entrance and two exit ramps, one critical region, one inspection re-
gion, and an example message region. The message region depicted is for a message 
broadcast at the point where the northern side of the road meets the critical region.
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Critical Region
Inspection Region
Message Region
0 100Meters
Figure 3.1: Road network
3.2 Vehicles
Vehicles in our system model are considered to be dimensionless points moving 
on the road network, according to the scenario generated by  the mobility generator. 
There is no distinction between different vehicle types such as motorcycles, cars and 
trucks. All vehicles are considered to be 1.5 meters tall, and antenna placement is done 
accordingly.
3.3 Events
An event is any phenomenon that causes a vehicle to emit a Virtual Sign message 
when observed by the vehicle’s onboard sensors. These phenomena could be traffic 
jams, accidents, slippery road conditions, etc. Events are tied to regions on the road 
called critical regions, and each such region can have one or more events attached to it.
1
2
3a
3b
Figure 3.2: Events
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Figure 3.2 shows the actions taken by  the vehicles in the network when a vehicle 
observes an event. In this scenario, the vehicle’s Electronic Stability Control (ESC) sys-
tem detects the slippery  road conditions and activates (1). The vehicle’s Onboard Unit 
(OBU), connected to the ESC system, creates a Virtual Sign message and broadcasts 
this message (2). Receiving vehicles process and store this message for forwarding (3a) 
or direct usage (3b).
3.4 Regions
We define three types of regions: critical regions, message regions and inspection 
regions. We consider the first two region types to be part of any real-life application, but 
the third region type is only used for performance evaluation purposes.
3.4.1 Critical Regions
Critical regions represent parts of the road network associated with one or more 
events that approaching drivers should be aware of, such as construction or accident 
sites, roadblocks, detours, slippery turns, etc. When a vehicle enters a critical region, its 
onboard sensors detect one or more phenomena, causing the vehicle to broadcast Virtual 
Sign messages.
In our simulations, we define a single critical region with 5 events.
3.4.2 Message Regions
A message region is the zone of relevance for a single message, defined by  the 
originator of the message. When a vehicle detects an event, it creates a new message 
and makes a decision about the area for which the information contained in the message 
is relevant. This area is called the message region for that message.
Message regions play an important role in our message forwarding mechanism: 
vehicles forward messages only  when themselves or the intended recipient is inside the 
12
message region for the message in question. Vehicle behavior related to message re-
gions is further explained in Chapter 6.
In our simulations, message regions are circular regions centered on the point 
where the vehicle first detects the event, and have a radius of 500 meters4.
3.4.3 Inspection Regions
An inspection region represents the area in which the messages generated by rea-
son of a critical region are relevant. In this sense, an inspection region is to a critical re-
gion what a message region is to an event.
Unlike critical regions or message regions, inspection regions are not part  of the 
simulations, but rather the performance evaluation process. Therefore, entering or leav-
ing an inspection region has no effect on a vehicle's behavior.
In our simulations, we define a single inspection region that  is 1100 meters long 
and 100 meters wide, covering all the entrance and exit  ramps, the critical region, and 
500 meters4 of straight road segment on each side of the critical region. We then base 
three of the four performance metrics defined in Section 7.2 on this inspection region.
3.5 Messages
3.5.1 Beacons
Beacons are one-hop broadcast messages sent by  each vehicle in the network at 
regular intervals, containing information such as the current position, direction and 
speed of the vehicle. According to the DSRC specifications, beacons must be sent every 
100 to 300 ms. In our simulations, beacons are sent every 200 ms.
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4 500 meters is the decision sight distance [38] for a vehicle traveling at 120 km/h, the 
speed limit for cars on Turkish highways.
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Figure 3.3: Structure of a beacon
Figure 3.3 shows the beacon structure used in our application. It contains a ran-
dom node ID, an increasing sequence number, a timestamp, and the position, speed and 
direction information of the sending vehicle, obtained from the GPS system. The final 
field in a beacon is a keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [39] of the 
beacon’s contents.
The primary purpose of beacons is to provide environmental awareness, but other 
information can be piggy-backed on beacons. For example, in our application, we in-
clude the fingerprints of the previously received Virtual Sign messages as a payload in 
beacons. When a vehicle receives a beacon from a neighboring vehicle, it  compares 
these fingerprints with the Virtual Sign messages it  has stored before and forwards the 
messages that  the beacon’s sender has not yet  received, but might be interested in. This 
behavior is further explained in Chapter 6.
3.5.2 Key Disclosure Messages
For beacons, we use an authentication mechanism based on the TESLA broadcast 
authentication protocol [36]. In the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol, messages 
contain an authentication code created using an HMAC algorithm, and the key for the 
HMAC algorithm is revealed in a second message called a key disclosure message.
Key disclosure messages are sent after a short delay δ following the beacon for 
which they reveal the HMAC key. This value is set to 20 ms in our simulations.
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Besides the random node ID, the HMAC key and a sequence number, some key 
disclosure messages also contain a group signature. The purpose and contents of key 
disclosure messages is further explained in Chapter 5.
3.5.3 Virtual Sign Messages
Virtual Sign messages are broadcast when vehicles observe an event on the road. 
They  contain the same basic information (time, position, speed and direction) as a bea-
con, but they also carry detailed information about the observed event.
Figure 3.4 shows the structure of a Virtual Sign message. The content and func-
tionality of the time, position, speed and direction fields are the same as a beacon. The 
event type field contains the type of the observed event, such as a traffic accident or 
slippery  road conditions. The message region field contains the message region associ-
ated with the observed event. The event details field is optional, and might include in-
formation such as measurements from onboard sensors, etc. Finally, the signature field 
contains a digital signature over the contents of the Virtual Sign message.
Position
Time Event Type
Speed Direction
Message Region
Event Details
Signature
Figure 3.4: Structure of a Virtual Sign message
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Note that Virtual Sign messages contain no ID information. Together with group 
signatures, this provides complete anonymity  for these messages. This is further ex-
plained in Section 5.4.
3.6 DSRC and WAVE
The network stack for vehicular communications is defined by two sets of stan-
dards. The physical and data link layers are defined by the IEEE 802.11p draft  standard 
[40], an amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard [41] based on the DSRC specifications 
[37]. The upper layers are defined by the IEEE 1609 standards [42-45], also commonly 
known as WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments). Figure 3.5 shows the 
OSI stack for ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems).
Application
Presentation
Session
Transport
Network
Data Link
Physical
IEEE 1609
IEEE 802.11p
Figure 3.5: The OSI stack for ITS
DSRC devices operate in the licensed 5.9 GHz ITS band using one control chan-
nel dedicated to control frames, and six general-purpose service channels, for a total of 
seven 10 MHz channels. Unlike 802.11a/b/g/n stations, 802.11p stations use all the 
channels defined in the standard. Channel time is divided into 100 ms sync intervals that 
consist of a control interval and a service interval. During the control interval, all sta-
tions are required to tune to the control channel, on which high-priority frames are 
transmitted. After the control interval, stations can tune to service channels for the re-
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mainder of the 100 ms. This allows the stations to achieve data rates of up  to 27 Mbps, 
or 54 Mbps using the optional 20 MHz channels. Table 3.1 shows channel allocations 
for both modes of operation.
Table 3.1: Channel allocation for WAVE
Channel Number Center Frequency (MHz) 10 MHz Mode 20 MHz Mode
172 5860 Service channel Service channel
174 5870 Service channel -
175 5875 - Service channel
176 5880 Service channel -
178 5890 Control channel Control channel
180 5900 Service channel -
181 5905 - Service channel
182 5910 Service channel -
184 5920 Service channel Service channel
In vehicular networks, the nodes are highly mobile, and therefore the OBUs usu-
ally have very limited time for transmission. For this reason, any  communication over-
head must be minimized. The IEEE 802.11p MAC tries to achieve this by  dropping 
MAC authentication, SSID association and beacon frames (not to be confused with 
DSRC beacons), allowing fully independent operation. Also, 802.11e Quality-of-
Service (QoS) is supported with 4 priority levels defined in the standard. These changes 
allow the vehicles to achieve the sub-50 ms communication latencies required by the 
DSRC specifications.
The DSRC specifications also state that all DSRC devices must be able to achieve 
a Packet Error Rate (PER) of less than 10% for a Physical-layer Service Data Unit 
(PSDU) length of 1000 bytes at 85 miles per hour, and for a PSDU length of 64 bytes at 
120 miles per hour. In [46], Gukhool and Cherkaoui compare IEEE 802.11a and 
802.11p  in VANET simulations, and conclude that using 802.11p decreases packet loss 
significantly. In our simulations, we assume the use of IEEE 802.11p for all communi-
cations.
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Chapter 4
MOBILITY
In Section 2.1, we emphasized the importance of a realistic mobility model, and 
observed that the existing approaches to vehicle mobility  fall under four main classes: 
Random Waypoint (RWP), enhanced RWP, GPS traces and micro-simulations. We also 
noted that the RWP model fails to generate realistic scenarios for vehicular networks, 
and that it is practically impossible to acquire GPS traces for all the vehicles on the road 
network.
Lacking the time and resources required for micro-simulations, we decided to use 
an enhanced RWP model. Of the two enhanced RWP models we inspected, STRAW [2] 
was not compatible with our simulator (ns2), and Saha and Johnson’s model [3] had cer-
tain drawbacks. We therefore introduce our own mobility generator, mugen.
mugen is inspired by, and works in a similar fashion to, the Saha and Johnson 
model, but has several advantages:
• The whole scenario is generated at once, instead of 10-second steps, resulting in 
smoother vehicle movement.
• Instead of a fixed number of vehicles, normally  distributed inter-arrival times are 
considered, resulting in more variance between different scenarios.
• Vehicles are added to, and removed from, the network as necessary, resulting in 
more realistic scenarios for simulations lasting more than a few seconds.
• Vehicles trigger certain events upon entering predefined regions, allowing us to 
simulate critical regions.
• Vehicles only use predefined entrance and exit points, allowing us to create realis-
tic highway scenarios.
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Unlike STRAW, mugen does not consider the number of lanes or the interaction 
between vehicles. While this may  be seen as a shortcoming of mugen, it should be noted 
that since we mainly focus on highway scenarios, vehicle interaction is minimal.
mugen takes the following parameters as input:
• A road network consisting of entrance, exit and intermediate points (P), and the 
roads between these points (R)
• One or more critical regions (G)
• The duration of the simulation (tsim)
• The vehicle density (ρv, in vehicles per hour) and the standard deviation of the 
inter-arrival times (σa, in seconds)
• The mean vehicle speed (µs, in meters per second) and the standard deviation of 
the vehicle speed (σs, in meters per second)
Using these parameters, mugen produces a partial ns2 script, along with a plot  of 
the number of vehicles in the network at any  given time during the simulation. Note 
that, unlike most other mobility generators, mugen does not take as input the number of 
vehicles, since this is computed dynamically  using the road network size, vehicle den-
sity and vehicle speed.
The way mugen works is explained in Algorithms A.1–A.5 in the appendix. The 
full source code for mugen is released under the GNU General Public License 3.0, can 
be found at http://github.com/cbguder/mugen.
4.1 Vehicle Density and Speed
For vehicle density  and speed, we tried to imitate İstanbul's traffic conditions. In 
[47], Wisitpongphan et al. analyze real-world data from Berkeley Highway Lab (BHL) 
and find a maximum vehicle density  of about 3500 vehicles per hour during the morn-
ing rush hours. The average speed during this time seems to cluster around 40 mph 
(≈17.88 m/s). Their measurements between 10:00 AM and 12:00 PM show a vehicle 
density of 2619 vehicles per hour, and an average speed of 29.15 m/s.
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The traffic conditions in İstanbul, however, are very different from Berkeley, CA. 
More than 12 million vehicles use the two bridges over the Bosporus in İstanbul [48] 
per month. This corresponds to an average of about 8333 vehicles per bridge per hour. 
Our own observations on the other hand, show a vehicle density  of up to 15000 vehicles 
per hour during the afternoon hours on the Trans-European Motorway (TEM), with vir-
tually no traffic congestion.
Drivers in İstanbul are used to crowded highways, and are more comfortable driv-
ing at higher speeds even when the inter-vehicle distance is very  short. The mean vehi-
cle speed therefore, was taken to be 20 m/s (72 km/h) in the slowest scenarios.
For our simulations, we considered three different cases, and generated 10 scenar-
ios for each case, for a total of 30 distinct scenarios. The first scenario set  represents 
night traffic with low vehicle density  (2600 veh./h) and high speed (108 km/h). The 
second scenario set represents a typical situation near the bridges, with medium vehicle 
density  (8333 veh./h) and lower speed (72 km/h). The third scenario set  is based on our 
measurements of afternoon traffic on TEM, with high vehicle density (15000 veh./h) 
and high speed (108 km/h). Note that the low density (2600 veh./h) scenarios can also 
be interpreted as high density  (15000 veh./h) scenarios where only  17% of the vehicles 
are equipped with OBUs.
The standard deviation of vehicle inter-arrival time was decreased with increasing 
vehicle density, while the standard deviation of vehicle speed was kept constant. Table 
4.1 shows the parameters given to mugen for all three scenario sets.
Table 4.1: mugen parameters for all three scenario sets
ρv (veh./h) µa (s) σa (s) µs (m/s) σs (m/s)
2600 1.38 0.8 30 4
8333 0.43 0.4 20 4
15000 0.24 0.3 30 4
Figure 4.1 shows the number of vehicles in the network for all three scenario sets, 
averaged over 10 scenarios.
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Figure 4.1: Average number of vehicles in the network
Figure 4.1 shows that the average number of vehicles in the network is around 
275 in the most crowded scenario set. Assuming 3 lanes per side of the road, this num-
ber corresponds to an average of 45.83 vehicles per lane, and therefore an average inter-
vehicle distance of about 65 meters for our 3 kilometer-long road network. Note that 
this inter-vehicle distance actually  allows much higher speeds, and therefore less con-
gestion and higher delivery rates.
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Chapter 5
PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Driving safety applications, such as our Virtual Sign application, are of vital im-
portance: they are the software counterpart of early  warning and recovery  technologies 
like anti-lock braking systems (ABS) or ESC. Any successful attack on these applica-
tions could potentially  result in the injury or death of the driver and/or passengers in the 
vehicle. Therefore, we need to set strict security requirements for our application.
5.1 Requirements
We set four basic requirements for our application: authentication, data integrity, 
non-repudiation and conditional privacy.
Authentication is the act of confirming that received messages are generated by 
the legitimate users of the network (i.e. registered vehicles), and is arguably the most 
crucial security requirement  for all driving safety  applications. If an adversary can suc-
cessfully  masquerade as a legitimate user, he could inject false or misleading data into 
the network. This could cause traffic accidents, or cause the drivers to change their 
routes, which could potentially  help  the adversary or adversaries commit other felonies, 
such as an assassination.
Data integrity  is the act of ensuring the received data is complete, valid and unal-
tered. This is to prevent malicious or accidental (e.g. transmission errors) modification 
of the messages.
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Non-repudiation is assuring that users cannot later deny sending certain messages, 
and is required to enforce liability on the users for possibly malicious behavior in the 
contexts of vehicle or network traffic.
Our final requirement is conditional privacy. Most driving safety applications, in-
cluding our Virtual Sign application, depend on vehicles to broadcast their location in-
formation periodically in messages called beacons. This information, albeit readily  col-
lectible without a vehicular network, can be used to track vehicles, threatening user pri-
vacy. While we want our users to remain anonymous, we also want to grant certain 
authorities (e.g. the police) the power to reveal the identity of certain users. This is re-
ferred to as conditional privacy.
Note that while non-repudiation and privacy can be seen as contradicting re-
quirements, this is not the case in our system, as we do not require total privacy, but 
only conditional privacy. All communication among vehicles should be completely 
anonymous, therefore it is not possible to speak about non-repudiation for inter-vehicle 
communications. However, if the authorities decide to reveal the origin of a certain 
message, then the user should not be able to deny sending the message in question, and 
liability should be enforced.
5.2 Digital Signatures
In Section 2.3, we explained that a purely cryptographic protocol based on con-
ventional (i.e. non-group) digital signatures fails to satisfy our requirement of condi-
tional privacy. In a group  signature scheme, on the other hand, group managers can re-
veal the identity of a message’s signer.
Although group  signatures satisfy all our requirements, public-key cryptography 
is notorious for being computationally expensive, and this is especially important in 
real-time applications running on embedded processors we assume will be used in 
OBUs.
Our measurements show that, given our assumptions of vehicle density  and bea-
con period, vehicles receive an average of 50 key disclosure messages per second, and a 
maximum of 245 key disclosure messages per second. If every key disclosure message 
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was digitally signed, and a whole CPU was dedicated to verifying digital signatures, the 
dedicated CPU would have little more than 4 ms to verify a signature. However, our 
benchmarks reveal a 40.60 ms verification delay  for the short group signature scheme 
proposed in [33]. The details of this benchmark is given in Section 7.1.1.
These numbers show that, in order to avoid dropping beacons, we need to either 
dramatically relax the beacon period, or decrease the number of group  signature verifi-
cations by an order of at least 10. Opting for the latter, we suggest the use of one-way 
hash chains along with group signatures in beacons.
5.3 Security Model
The use of one-way  hash chains for one-time password authentication was first 
proposed by Lamport  in [49]. Later, Haller defined the S/KEY one-time password sys-
tem [50,51]. In [36], Perrig et al. suggested the use of hash chains as part of the TESLA 
broadcast authentication protocol. In the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol, all 
messages include an authentication code generated using a keyed-Hash Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC) function, and the symmetric keys for the HMAC are 
taken from a one-way hash chain in reverse order. These keys are then revealed after a 
short waiting period in key disclosure messages. Public-key cryptography is only used 
for time synchronization messages.
In [35], Lin et al. propose using the TESLA authentication scheme in a vehicular 
context. In their proposed TSVC protocol, each vehicle periodically  broadcasts the first 
element (tip) of the hash chain, so that new vehicles entering its transmission range can 
authenticate messages. Messages including the tip of the hash chain are signed using an 
anonymous key pair. We suggest  a similar authentication protocol for beacons, using 
group signatures.
Let H(x) be a one-way hash function [52] with the following properties:
• H takes as input a message x of arbitrary length and produces a fixed-length digest 
H(x)
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• Given x, it is computationally easy to compute H(x), but it is computationally  in-
feasible to find any x such that H(x) = h, given h. This is referred to as preimage 
resistance.
• Given x, it  is computationally  infeasible to find x′ ≠ x such that H(x′) = H(x). This 
is referred to as weak collision resistance.
• It is computationally  infeasible to find any pair x, x′ such that H(x) = H(x′). This is 
referred to as strong collision resistance.
We can then define a hash chain of length N as the list of hash values H(x), H2(x), 
H3(x),…, HN(x), where Hn(x) = H(Hn-1(x)) = H(H(H(…(H(x))…))) (n times).
In our application, every vehicle generates a hash chain (Algorithm 5.1), and uses 
the elements of this hash chain in reverse order (i.e. from HN(x) to H(x)) as the keys of a 
HMAC function in the beacons it broadcasts (Algorithm 5.2). The HMAC key for each 
beacon is revealed shortly after the beacon in a compact key disclosure message (Algo-
rithm 5.3). The security  of our protocol, and all hash chain-based authentication proto-
cols in general, depend mainly on the preimage resistance property of hash functions.
Algorithm 5.1  INITIALIZE-HASH-CHAIN()
(1) ID ← random number
(2) x ← random byte string
(3) hk ← H(x)
(4) i ← k − 1
(5) while i > 0 do
(6) hi ← H(hi+1)
(7) i ← i − 1
(8) end for
(9) last_signed_seq ← 1 − k
(10) next_seq ← 1
A random node ID (or pseudonym) and a sequence number is used to associate 
beacons with key  disclosure messages, and key  disclosure messages with previously 
received key disclosure messages. This ID is changed every  time the hash chain is re-
initialized. Old beacons and key disclosure messages are automatically  purged by a 
background process to avoid treating a single vehicle as two vehicles due to an ID 
change.
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Algorithm 5.2  SEND-BEACON()
(1) key ← hnext_seq
(2) create new beacon b
(3) b.time ← system time
(4) b.source ← ID
(5) b.position ← current position from GPS
(6) b.speed ← current speed from speedometer or GPS
(7) b.direction ← current direction from GPS
(8) b.messages ← {(m.type, m.region) | m ∈ M}
(9) payload ← (b.source ǁ‖ b.time ǁ‖ b.position ǁ‖ b.speed ǁ‖ b.direction ǁ‖ b.messages)
(10) b.hmac ← HMACkey(payload)
(11) SEND(b)
(12) wait for key disclosure interval δ
(13) SEND-KEY-DISCLOSURE(key, next_seq)
(14) if next_seq = k then
(15) INITIALIZE-HASH-CHAIN()
(16) else
(17) next_seq ← next_seq + 1
(18) end if
Algorithm 5.3  SEND-KEY-DISCLOSURE(key, seq)
(1) create new key disclosure message kd
(2) kd.source ← ID
(3) kd.seq_no ← seq
(4) kd.key ← key
(5) if seq = last_signed_seq + k then
(6) kd.signature ← SIGN(kd.source ǁ‖ kd.seq_no ǁ‖ kd.key)
(7) last_signed_seq ← seq
(8) end if
(9) SEND(kd)
Authentication is provided by the combination of the one-way hash chain and 
group signatures. One in every k  key disclosure messages is signed using a group signa-
ture, where k  is a system parameter that can have a fixed value or can be determined 
dynamically5. In the case that k is determined dynamically, the decision to change the 
value of k  for future messages must be announced in a signed message. Note that k also 
determines the length of the hash chain: the hash chain cannot be made shorter than k, 
and making it longer does not provide additional benefits.
When a vehicle receives a beacon (Algorithm 5.4), the beacon is stored, but tem-
porarily ignored. To be able to verify  the HMAC value in a beacon, the receiver must 
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5 In our simulations, k is constant at 10.
have received at least one signed key disclosure message from the same sender, so all 
beacons and key disclosure messages are discarded until a signed key disclosure mes-
sage is received.
Algorithm 5.4  RECEIVE-BEACON(b)
(1) Bb.source ← b
Algorithm 5.5  RECEIVE-KEY-DISCLOSURE(kd)
(1) if kd is signed then
(2) if kd.signature is valid then
(3) Kkd.source ← kd.key
(4) else
(5) delete Kkd.source
(6) end if
(7) else if Kkd.source exists then
(8) if H(kd.key) = Kkd.source then
(9) Kkd.source ← kd.key
(10) else
(11) delete Kkd.source
(12) end if
(13) end if
(14) if Kkd.source exists and Bkd.source exists then
(15) b ← Bkd.source
(16) key ← Kkd.source
(17) payload ← (b.source ǁ‖ b.time ǁ‖ b.position ǁ‖ b.speed ǁ‖ b.direction ǁ‖ b.messages)
(18) if HMACkey(payload) = b.hmac then
(19) PROCESS-BEACON(b)
(20) end if
(21) end if
(22) delete Bkd.source
Upon reception of a signed key  disclosure message (Algorithm 5.5), the group 
signature on the message is verified, and the disclosed key is used to verify the HMAC 
on the last beacon received from the same sender. If both verifications succeed, the 
newly disclosed key is stored. For subsequent beacon/key  disclosure message pairs, the 
disclosed key is compared with the previously stored key using the hash algorithm de-
fined by the protocol, and the stored key is updated. If one of these verifications (group 
signature, hash or HMAC), the beacon, the key disclosure message and the previously 
stored key (if any) are immediately discarded.
Using this protocol, we are able to decrease the computational load on OBUs by a 
factor of almost k, and the average delay between receiving a beacon and processing 
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this beacon by more than 40%. In a pure group signature-based protocol, there would be 
a group signature verification delay for each beacon. In our scheme, this delay is amor-
tized by the following k-1 beacons. Hash and HMAC delays are negligible.
5.4 Location Privacy
Linkability is defined as being able to link two messages sent by the same OBU at 
different times. If messages can be linked, then eavesdroppers can track vehicles by 
linking all the messages sent by  a single OBU. Assuring unlinkability is an important 
step in providing location privacy in VANET applications.
On the other hand, some VANET applications require short-term linkability. For 
example, in our proposed security model, we need to be able to link two consecutive 
key disclosure messages, and a beacon with its corresponding key disclosure message. 
While our proposed security model does not aim to provide complete unlinkability, it 
does provide complete anonymity, and we take certain measures to avoid disclosing 
more information than necessary.
The group signature scheme we employ creates unlinkable signatures. As ex-
plained in Section 3.5.3, Virtual Sign messages do not contain any identity information, 
so no two Virtual Sign messages can be linked.
For beacons and key disclosure messages on the other hand, we use a random ID 
(or a pseudonym) to provide short-term linkability. This ID is changed every  time the 
hash chain is reinitialized (every  k beacons), and therefore only messages using the 
same hash chain can be linked. Note that these messages could still be linked by using 
the elements of the hash chain, even if we did not include a vehicle ID.
Two beacons, one sent just before an ID change and one sent right after, can still 
be linked, especially when the vehicle density is low. This is due to the deterministic 
nature of beacons: when and where the next beacon will be broadcast can be determined 
with very  high accuracy. Our security model does not employ a mechanism to prevent 
this, but existing mechanisms, such as silent periods [53] or mix-zones [54] can be used 
in conjunction with our model.
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Chapter 6
THE ADAPTIVE-P ALGORITHM
Vehicles running the Virtual Sign application broadcast Virtual Sign messages on 
two occasions: upon entering a critical region, and upon receiving a beacon.
When a vehicle enters a critical region, its onboard sensors and/or driving assis-
tance systems such as ABS and ESC detect one or more events, and the vehicle broad-
casts Virtual Sign messages containing information about these events. On the other 
hand, since Virtual Sign messages are meant to be area-persistent, vehicles might for-
ward relevant Virtual Sign messages to other vehicles from time to time. When and how 
these Virtual Sign messages are broadcast is determined by the routing algorithm.
We propose a probabilistic routing algorithm called the “Adaptive-p” algorithm 
that takes into account the road and network conditions to decide whether or not to 
broadcast Virtual Sign messages. The Adaptive-p algorithm works thusly:
When a vehicle receives a Virtual Sign message, it first verifies the group signa-
ture on the message. If the signature is valid, the message is processed, and its contents, 
along with the time the message is received, are stored. If an equivalent message (i.e. a 
message having the same event type and region) has been stored before, only  the time is 
updated. This is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1  RECEIVE-VIRTUAL-SIGN(m)
(1) if m.signature is valid then
(2) if ∃ m′ ∈ M | m ~ m′ then
(3) m′.time ← m.time
(4) else
(5) M ← M ∪ {m}
(6) end if
(7) end if
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When a vehicle detects an event, it creates a new Virtual Sign message, and 
checks to see if it has previously stored an equivalent message. If no equivalent message 
has been stored before, the message is broadcast. If, however, an equivalent message 
has been stored before, the message is broadcast with a probability pb proportional to 
the amount of time since the last such message is stored. So if an event is detected at te 
and an equivalent message has been stored at tm, we have
pb =
te − tm
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Algorithm 6.2  DETECT-EVENT(e)
(1) create new Virtual Sign message m
(2) m.type ← e.type
(3) m.region.center ← current position from GPS
(4) m.region.radius ← 500m
(5) if ∃ m′ ∈ M | m ~ m′ then
(6) pb ← (e.time − m′.time) ⁄ 60.0
(7) if RANDOM() < pb then
(8) SEND(m)
(9) end if
(10) else
(11) SEND(m)
(12) end if
When a vehicle receives a beacon, it compares the Virtual Sign message finger-
prints contained in the beacon with the Virtual Sign messages it has stored before. If a 
Virtual Sign message has previously  been stored by the receiving vehicle, and its fin-
gerprint is not included in the beacon, the vehicle proceeds to check the message’s re-
gion. If the message region contains either of the two vehicles (beacon sender and re-
ceiver), then the message is broadcast with a probability  pf inversely proportional to the 
number of vehicles around (i.e. inside its transmission range) the forwarder. So if the 
number of vehicles around the forwarder is n, we have
pf =
1
n
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Algorithm 6.3  PROCESS-BEACON(b)
(1) pf ← 1.0 ⁄ n
(2) position ← current position from GPS
(3) for all m ∈ M do
(4) if ∄ m′ ∈ b.messages | m ~ m′ then
(5) if position ∈ m.region or b.position ∈ m.region then
(6) if RANDOM() < pf then
(7) FORWARD(m)
(8) end if
(9) end if
(10) end if
(11) end for
6.1 Probability Analysis
We analyze the probabilities (pb and pf) produced by the Adaptive-p algorithm. 
Table 6.1 shows the average values and standard deviations (σ) for pb and pf, as an aver-
age of 10 scenarios.
Table 6.1: Overall average probabilities for all three scenario sets
ρv (veh./h) µs (m/s) Mean pb σ(pb) Mean pf σ(pf)
2600 30 0.244 0.407 0.059 0.022
8333 20 0.242 0.374 0.063 0.082
15000 30 0.358 0.443 0.064 0.090
Figures 6.1–6.3 show how the average values for pb and pf change over time. The 
values are averaged over 10 scenarios. The increase in pb with increasing vehicle den-
sity can be explained by  the increased load on the network, and therefore some mes-
sages taking longer to reach certain vehicles.
Although pf is inversely proportional to vehicle density, it increases over time for 
medium and high vehicle densities. This is a direct result of the increasing network con-
gestion. As the network becomes more congested, the number of beacons that cannot be 
authenticated also increases, causing forwarders to increase pf. The zigzag pattern is 
caused by our choice of k  and beacon period. pf increases until a signed key  disclosure 
message arrives, and decreases after, creating a pattern with a period of 2 seconds.
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6.2 Flooding and Constant-p Algorithms
We compare our Adaptive-p algorithm with two other routing algorithms: flood-
ing and Constant-p.
The Constant-p algorithm is the same as the Adaptive-p algorithm, except the 
broadcasting and forwarding probabilities are always constant, so we have pb = pf = p at 
all times, for a predefined value of p.
As a base case for performance evaluation, we consider a flooding algorithm, 
where all beacons are ignored and message forwarding is only done upon reception of a 
new Virtual Sign message. Note that the definition of a “new” (i.e. not received before) 
Virtual Sign message is per the Adaptive-p algorithm: messages contents are compared 
rather than unique packet  IDs, making our flooding implementation much more effi-
cient than the common perception of a flooding algorithm.
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Chapter 7
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
7.1 Simulation Setup
We used ns-2.33 as our simulator, with the final patch and IEEE 802.11p parame-
ters for ns2 from [55].
As explained in Section 4.1, we generated 10 scenarios of 60 seconds each for 
three parameter sets using mugen. The first scenario set has a vehicle density of ρv = 
2600 veh./h and a mean vehicle speed of µs = 30 m/s, the second scenario set has a ve-
hicle density of ρv = 8333 veh./h and a mean vehicle speed of µs = 20 m/s, and the third 
scenario set has a vehicle density of ρv = 15000 veh./h and a mean vehicle speed of µs = 
30 m/s.
All simulations are run on a personal computer with the following configuration:
• Ubuntu 9.04 (64-bit)
• Intel Core 2 Duo E6600 Processor at 2.4 GHz
• 6 GB CL6 DDR2 SDRAM at 800 MHz
• GCC 4.3.3
All 30 scenarios are run with 5 different algorithms: flooding, Constant-p (for p = 
0.2, 0.5 and 1.0) and Adaptive-p.
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7.1.1 Latency Due To Cryptographic Operations
For group signatures, we assume a 50.91 ms signing delay, and a 40.60 ms verifi-
cation delay. These values were obtained by benchmarking the short group signature 
scheme from [33] using the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [56] on the per-
sonal computer with the configuration given in Section 7.1, and taking the average of 10 
benchmarks.
We used the parameter set a included in PBC, for a base field size of 512 bits and 
an embedding degree of 2 on the curve y2 = x3 + x. The group order is a 160-bit Solinas 
prime [57].
7.1.2 Antennas
We assume one omnidirectional antenna per vehicle, placed on the roof of the car, 
1.5 meters from the ground. The transmission rate is set to 6 Mbps, resulting in an aver-
age transmission range of 600 meters using the Nakagami radio propagation model [58] 
implementation from [55] with the default parameters.
7.2 Performance Metrics
We consider four metrics for each configuration: awareness delay, message traffic, 
delivery rate and the number of events received.
7.2.1 Awareness Delay
We define awareness delay as the amount of time it takes a vehicle to reach full 
awareness after it enters the inspection region, where full awareness is defined as hav-
ing received at least one message regarding each event.
This value is considered to be 0 for vehicles that have full awareness before enter-
ing the inspection region. This is only possible if vehicles enter the message regions be-
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fore they enter the inspection region, and in our road network, only vehicles utilizing 
the entrance ramps can reach full awareness before they enter the inspection region.
The awareness delay for vehicles that leave the network in the first 10 seconds of 
the simulation, and the vehicles that enter the network in the last 10 seconds of the 
simulation are discarded to be able to capture the stable state of the network. Almost 
none of the vehicles in these two sets ever reach full awareness, as they simply do not 
spend enough time in the network to. Assuming the road conditions subject to the Vir-
tual Sign messages sent predate the beginning of our simulations, most  (if not all) of the 
vehicles in the first set should have already reached full awareness by the time the simu-
lation started. The vehicles in the second set, on the other hand, would have reached full 
awareness if the simulations lasted longer.
7.2.2 Message Traffic
We define message traffic as the average number of Virtual Sign messages sent by 
each vehicle upon entering a critical region (and therefore detecting certain events), or 
forwarded in response to beacons. Note that the beacons are not considered, since they 
are mandated by the DSRC, and therefore the same amount of beacon traffic would ex-
ist without our Virtual Sign application. Also note that the average number of beacons 
sent by each vehicle stays almost constant between different scenarios, since beacons 
are sent at regular intervals, and never forwarded.
7.2.3 Delivery Rate
We define the delivery  rate as the number of fully aware vehicles inside the in-
spection region divided by the total number of vehicles inside the inspection region at 
any given time.
Let E be the set of all events associated with the critical region, and e(v,t) be the 
set of unique events received by vehicle v  on or before time t. Also let I(t) be the set of 
vehicles inside the inspection region at time t. The delivery rate at time t can then be 
defined as
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DR(t) = {v ∈I(t) | E = e(v,t)}I(t)
7.2.4 Number of Events Received
We measure the average number of events received by  each vehicle inside the in-
spection region as a measure of how close these vehicles are to full awareness. The av-
erage number of events received at time t is defined as
NER(t) =
e(v,t)
v∈I (t )
∑
I(t)
7.3 Results
Tables 7.1–7.3 show the mean awareness delay, the standard deviation of aware-
ness delay, and average message traffic for the five algorithms compared. Table 7.1 
shows the results for the night scenarios (ρv = 2600 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s), Table 7.2 
shows the results for the bridge scenarios (ρv = 8333 veh./h, µs = 20 m/s), and Table 7.3 
shows the results for the TEM scenarios (ρv = 15000 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s).
Table 7.1: Simulation Results for ρv = 2600 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Algorithm Mean Delay (s) Std. Dev. of Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.62 1.29 21.30
0.12 0.21 33.68
0.11 0.19 65.97
0.11 0.18 118.45
0.14 0.24 20.85
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Table 7.2: Simulation Results for ρv = 8333 veh./h, µs = 20 m/s
Algorithm Mean Delay (s) Std. Dev. of Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
1.15 2.11 27.91
0.35 0.57 34.98
0.34 0.60 72.08
0.30 0.57 139.36
0.26 0.52 50.97
Table 7.3: Simulation Results for ρv = 15000 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Algorithm Mean Delay (s) Std. Dev. of Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.99 1.69 26.98
0.53 1.04 40.51
0.60 1.24 87.04
0.50 1.08 158.04
0.46 1.07 77.85
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the Adaptive-p algorithm delivers the shortest 
awareness delays in the medium and high density scenario sets, and decreases the mes-
sage traffic by more than 50% when compared to the algorithm delivering the second 
shortest awareness delays (Constant-p = 1.0) in both cases. In the low density scenario, 
the Adaptive-p algorithm slightly increases the awareness delay, but causes minimal 
message traffic.
Figures 7.1–7.3 show the average delivery  rates for all the algorithms against 
time. The delivery rates depicted in the graphs are the averages of 10 scenarios.
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Figure 7.1: Delivery rates for ρv = 2600 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
Time (s)
Adaptive p
p = 0.2
p = 0.5
p = 1.0
Flooding
Figure 7.2: Delivery rates for ρv = 8333 veh./h, µs = 20 m/s
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Figure 7.3: Delivery rates for ρv = 15000 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Figures 7.1–7.3 show that the Adaptive-p and Constant-p algorithms result in 
comparable delivery rates. Note that it  takes longer for algorithms with higher p to reach 
a stable state, with the Adaptive-p algorithm stabilizing in less than 2 seconds in all sce-
nario sets. The flooding algorithm gives the worst overall delivery in all scenario sets.
As explained in Section 7.2, Figures 7.1–7.3 show the percentage of fully aware 
vehicles inside the inspection region at any  given time. However, there is a small per-
centage of vehicles inside the inspection region that are not fully  aware (i.e. have not 
received information regarding all events). Our final performance metric reveals how 
close these vehicles are to full awareness.
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Figure 7.6: Average number of events received for ρv = 15000 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Figures 7.4–7.6 show very  similar results with figures 7.1–7.3. Again, the prob-
abilistic algorithms show comparable performance, with the flooding algorithm deliver-
ing the lowest results.
7.3.1 Manhattan Scenarios
Although mugen is not yet fully optimized for non-highway traffic, we wanted to 
test the Adaptive-p algorithm in a Manhattan scenario, and created a road network (Fig-
ure 7.7) that represents a 4-by-8-block Manhattan neighborhood. Each block was taken 
to be 280 by 80 meters, a common block size in Manhattan, New York. The roads be-
tween the blocks are one-way streets, with each street running in the opposite direction 
as its parallels. The critical region was selected to cover the middle intersection, while 
the inspection covers up to 500 meters of the two roads approaching the critical region.
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Figure 7.7: Manhattan road network
Table 7.4: mugen parameters for the Manhattan scenario set
ρv (veh./h) µa (s) σa (s) µs (m/s) σs (m/s)
2600 1.38 0.8 10 4
Table 7.5: Simulation Results for the Manhattan scenario set
Algorithm Mean Delay (s) Std. Dev. of Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.96 3.48 19.33
0.46 1.10 12.89
0.54 1.33 25.46
0.25 0.55 44.00
0.29 0.71 19.13
Table 7.5 shows that  the non-probabilistic algorithm delivers shorter awareness 
delays than the Adaptive-p algorithm in the Manhattan scenarios, albeit at  the cost of a 
130% increase in message traffic. Unlike the highway scenarios, Virtual Sign traffic is 
low and the beacon traffic is high in this scenario set. The total (as opposed to per vehi-
cle) Virtual Sign traffic is 25% of the high-density  highway set, and only twice that of 
the low-density  highway  set. This characteristic prevents the non-probabilistic algo-
rithm from causing significant network congestion, and therefore allows it to perform 
better than it does in the highway scenarios.
43
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
Time (s)
Adaptive p
p = 0.2
p = 0.5
p = 1.0
Flooding
Figure 7.8: Delivery rates for the Manhattan scenario set
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
E v
e n
t s  
R e
c e
i v e
d
Time (s)
Adaptive p
p = 0.2
p = 0.5
p = 1.0
Flooding
Figure 7.9: Average number of events received for the Manhattan scenario set
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7.3.2 Analysis of System Parameter k
In sections 5.2 and 5.3, we defined k as a crucial system parameter, and explained 
why we chose the value 10 for k in our simulations. Although the cryptographic bench-
marks we have conducted do not allow for lower values of k, higher values can still be 
used to further decrease the computational load on OBUs, possibly  at the cost of higher 
awareness delays.
To confirm this, we ran all our simulations for two additional values of k: 15 and 
20. The simulation results show no significant change in delivery rates, but awareness 
delays and message traffic were affected. For the sake of brevity, we omit the delivery 
graphs, and present the numeric results in Tables 7.6-7.9.
Table 7.6: Analysis of k for ρv = 2600 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Algorithm
Mean Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.62 0.56 0.56 21.30 21.98 21.87
0.12 0.12 0.12 33.68 33.89 33.69
0.11 0.10 0.11 65.97 60.68 65.73
0.11 0.11 0.11 118.45 105.62 109.71
0.14 0.13 0.14 20.85 21.96 22.24
Table 7.7: Analysis of k for ρv = 8333 veh./h, µs = 20 m/s
Algorithm
Mean Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
1.15 1.03 0.98 27.91 27.47 28.44
0.35 0.41 0.48 34.98 30.34 28.67
0.34 0.49 0.38 72.08 62.80 58.21
0.30 0.43 0.49 139.36 128.31 107.49
0.26 0.31 0.39 50.97 44.51 43.49
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Table 7.8: Analysis of k for ρv = 15000 veh./h, µs = 30 m/s
Algorithm
Mean Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.99 1.00 0.87 26.98 28.16 27.42
0.53 0.56 0.67 40.51 33.02 29.57
0.60 0.62 0.65 87.04 73.89 62.23
0.50 0.58 0.83 158.04 131.52 114.13
0.46 0.55 0.56 77.85 57.60 51.11
Table 7.9: Analysis of k for the Manhattan scenario set
Algorithm
Mean Delay (s) Traffic (packets)
k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Flooding
Constant-p = 0.2
Constant-p = 0.5
Constant-p = 1.0
Adaptive-p
0.96 0.44 0.51 19.33 19.17 19.60
0.46 0.25 0.46 12.89 12.00 11.03
0.54 0.35 0.24 25.46 22.87 20.80
0.25 0.30 0.40 44.00 40.65 37.57
0.29 0.23 0.39 19.13 16.40 17.14
Tables 7.6-7.9 show that the awareness delay increases while the message traffic 
decreases with increasing k  for the Adaptive-p and Constant-p algorithms in the medium 
(8333 veh./h) and high (15000 veh./h) density  highway scenarios. This is expected, 
since as k  increases the number of beacons that cannot be authenticated, and therefore 
discarded, also increase. This causes less Virtual Sign messages to be forwarded, de-
creasing message traffic and increasing the awareness delay.
In the low density (2600 veh./h) highway scenario, increasing values of k do not 
cause any significant change in awareness delays or message traffic. Also note that re-
gardless of the values of k  and p, the Adaptive-p and Constant-p algorithms deliver very 
similar awareness delays in this scenario set, although the message traffic increases with 
increasing p. This is because the total network traffic in this scenario set is low enough 
46
to avoid most collisions and packet drops due to overfilled network interface queues, 
but the vehicle density is high enough not to create a disconnected network.
The flooding algorithm shows a trend of decreasing awareness delays with in-
creasing k. Since beacons are ignored in the flooding algorithm, this can only be caused 
by the overall decrease in total network traffic, and therefore less network congestion.
In Section 5.2, we explained why k  cannot be smaller than 10 for our parameters 
and assumptions, and this minimal value proved to be optimal for the Adaptive-p and 
Constant-p algorithms in the medium and high density  highway scenarios, and near-
optimal in the low density highway scenarios. The results for the Manhattan scenarios 
on the other hand, are irregular, with k = 15 delivering the best results overall. In Sec-
tion 5.3, we suggested that  k can be made adaptive, and having the highest beacon traf-
fic in all scenario sets, the Manhattan scenarios are a great example of where k might be 
increased voluntarily.
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Chapter 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we proposed an enhanced random waypoint mobility model, a secu-
rity  model based on group signatures and one-way hash chains, and a probabilistic 
method for the dissemination of area-persistent safety messages in vehicular ad hoc 
networks.
Simulation results show that the Adaptive-p algorithm ensures the prompt deliv-
ery of all Virtual Sign messages to virtually all vehicles approaching the critical region, 
giving the drivers more than 485 meters of decision distance in all scenarios considered. 
Compared with the non-probabilistic (Constant-p = 1.0) algorithm, the Adaptive-p algo-
rithm decreased the message traffic by more than 50% in all scenarios, and shortened 
the awareness delay by up to 13%.
In Chapter 4, we presented an enhanced RWP model that creates highway and 
manhattan scenarios, based on realistic assumptions. We noted that while mugen does 
not currently consider interactions between vehicles, the number of lanes or traffic con-
gestion, these were expected to be minimal in the cases inspected in this thesis. Work is 
currently underway to add support for simulated driver reactions to received Virtual 
Sign messages, along with all the aforementioned features to mugen. This would allow 
us to create even more realistic scenarios.
For our security  model, we used group signatures and an authentication protocol 
based on the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol. We defined a system parameter 
k for our beacon authentication protocol in Section 5.3. The value of k was constant at 
10 in our simulations, and while any value lower than 10 is unrealistic when we con-
sider the computational load on the OBUs, we inspected the consequences of using 
higher values for k in Section 7.3.2. We concluded that while the lowest possible value 
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of k  is optimal for highway scenarios, using higher values of k can decrease awareness 
delays and message traffic in Manhattan scenarios. We also noted that  our proposed pro-
tocol also allows k  to be changed dynamically, and we believe this makes an interesting 
subject for possible future work.
Similarly, we assumed 5 events per critical region in order to test  the performance 
of the Adaptive-p algorithm under increased network load. Considering the number of 
driving safety systems and sensors on today’s vehicles, we believe this number is an 
upper bound on the number of events that can be associated with a single critical region, 
but less events per region and multiple critical regions can be inspected.
In our simulations, we assumed the use of one omnidirectional antenna per vehi-
cle, which is partly  due to the limitations of our simulator of choice, ns2. We believe the 
use of directional antennas (two bumper antennas in particular) can be an interesting 
subject for future work, and increase the performance of the Adaptive-p algorithm.
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APPENDIX
Algorithm A.1  MUGEN(P, R, G, tsim, ρv, σa, µs, σs)
(1) S ← FIND-PATHS(P, R)
(2) ttrim ← MAX({ℓ(s) | s ∈ S}) ⁄ µs
(3) T ← tsim + ttrim
(4) V ← GENERATE-MOVEMENT(S, T, ρv, σa, µs, σs)
(5) V ← TRIM(V, ttrim)
(6) ADD-COLLISIONS(V, G, tsim)
Algorithm A.2  FIND-PATHS(P, R)
(1) S ← ∅
(2) En ← P ∖ {p ∈ P | ∃ r ∈ R, r.start = p}
(3) Ex ← P ∖ {p ∈ P | ∃ r ∈ R, r.end = p}
(4) for all r ∈ R | r.start ∈ En do
(5) s ← {r.start, r.end}
(6) S ← S ∪ {s}
(7) end for
(8) while ∃ s ∈ S | sn ∉ Ex do
(9) C ← {r ∈ R | r.start = sn}
(10) for all c ∈ C do
(11) S ← S ∪ {{s1, s2,…, sn-1, c.end}}
(12) end for
(13) S ← S ∖ s
(14) end while
(15) return S
Algorithm A.3  GENERATE-MOVEMENT(S, T, ρv, σa, µs, σs)
(1) µa ← 3600 ⁄ ρv
(2) t ← 0
(3) V ← ∅
(4) while t < T do
(5) create vehicle v
(6) v.speed ← GAUSS(µs, σs)
(7) v.arrival ← t + GAUSS(µa, σa)
(8) v.path ← pick s ∈ S uniformly at random
(9) V ← V ∪ {v}
(10) t ← v.arrival
(11) end while
(12) return V
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Algorithm A.4  TRIM(V, ttrim)
(1) V’ ← ∅
(2) for all v ∈ V do
(3) t ← v.arrival − ttrim
(4) T ← {t}
(5) for all pi, pi+1 ∈ v.path do
(6) t ← t + δ(pi, pi+1) ⁄ v.speed
(7) T ← T ∪ {t}
(8) end for
(9) if T1 < tsim and Tn ≥ 0 then
(10) if T1 < 0 then
(11) f ← smallest i such that Ti ≥ 0
(12) p0 ← interpolate position at t = 0
(13) v.arrival ← 0
(14) v.path ← {p0, v.pathf,…, v.pathn}
(15) T ← {0, Ti,…, Tn}
(16) end if
(17) v.times ← T
(18) V’ ← V’ ∪ {v}
(19) end if
(20) end for
(21) return V’
Algorithm A.5  ADD-COLLISIONS(V, G, tsim)
(1) for all v ∈ V do
(2) for all pi, pi+1 ∈ v.path do
(3) for all g ∈ G do
(4) c ← COHEN-SUTHERLAND(g, {pi, pi+1})
(5) if c ≠ NULL then
(6) c.time ← c.time + v.arrival
(7) v.collisions ← v.collisions ∪ {c}
(8) end if
(9) end for
(10) end for
(11) end for
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